THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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ROUND TABLE

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

A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

APAN: SETTING SUN?

ENNET · H. F. MacNAIR · N. PEFFER

BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY · 178

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ROUND TABLE

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NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

JAPAN: Setting Sun?

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

TYLER DENNET, Former Historical Adviser to the State Department; Former President of Williams College

HARLEY F. MACNAIR, Professor of Far Eastern History and Institutions, University of Chicago

NATHANIEL PEFFER, Professor of International Relations, Columbia University

* A radio discussion broadcast from Radio City, New York, over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, August 10, 1941, at 2:30 P.M., Eastern Daylight Saving Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

JAPAN:
Setting Sun?

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Far to the west of the setting sun lies Japan, Land of the Rising Sun. For more than four years Japan has poured armies and equipment into China in a war that is known to the Japanese as the "China incident." Of late the Japanese, following the announcement of Germany's "new order" for Europe, have sketched plans for a "Greater East Asia" and have taken steps to assure the achievement of this program.

From the South Pacific come reports of Japanese naval and air concentrations in the neighborhood of Siam. The Netherlands East Indies —source of American tin and rubber—have stood their ground before Japanese economic assaults. The Pacific Ocean is alive with rumor, and vital American interests will, according to government spokesmen, be endangered by any change in the "status quo" in that area.

What are these dangers? What are Japan's plans for East Asia? How strong is Japan—economically, politically, and militarily? What can America do about it?

To answer these and other important questions suggested by recent events in the Far East, the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE *invited three expert observers, familiar with Japan, its political leaders, and its traditions, to its microphone to discuss "Japan: Setting Sun?"*

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MR. PEFFER: Gentlemen, we are discussing the Far East: Japan and the Far East; America and the Far East.

The reason is obvious. A week from today this country and Japan may be at war. Certainly it is not rhetorical to say that Japan and America are nearer war today than they have ever been in their history.

It is not easy to understand. Why should this country now be contemplating sending expeditions across the Pacific to Asia?

MR. DENNET: I think we must answer the question that has already been raised, namely, "Is Japan bluffing?" I think the answer is, "No, she is not bluffing."

Japan faces a very real situation. We will do well to understand it. She is a somewhat industrialized nation. Perhaps she is half-industrialized. She is emerging from feudalism. She has brought her people down from the mountains and tied them to machines. These machines must be kept running. They must get their raw materials from the far corners of the earth. And in order to keep the machines going, the products must be distributed again to the far corners of the earth.[1]

She has the advantages of very cheap labor. She has encountered obstacles, and she feels that she has been choked more and more; and now she is going to take things into her own hands.

MR. MACNAIR: It seems to me that, while I take no exception to any statement that you have made, your argument, as a whole, is insufficient. You are assuming that because Japan has certain economic or strategic or political problems these are all new and haven't appeared before the governments and the chancellors of all the countries of the world.

It seems to me that the point at stake is why Japan feels that, in

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[1] *The chart on page 14 indicates to what extent Japan is dependent upon foreign markets for certain materials essential both to industry and to the average consumer. A significant amount of foodstuffs is imported annually from the territories recently acquired on the Asiatic continent, tending to make the Empire self-sufficient in this respect.*

JAPAN'S WARTIME ECONOMY

Increasing Emphasis on Heavy Industry, 1929 and 1939



DATA ON CHIEF INDUSTRIES FROM T. Y. HU, "JAPAN'S ECONOMY UNDER WAR STRAIN" (1941)

order to solve her problems of gaining materials and gaining markets, it is necessary for her to conquer the countries where these raw materials are to be found? Isn't that a question that is of practical value?

MR. DENNET: Of course she has to conquer these countries, the way the world has been running in the last twenty years, if she is going to preserve her markets. She has been shut out here and curtailed there, just as other nations have been; and it is a matter of life and death for her.

She has very small resources. The Japanese haven't the resources we have. They haven't the resources that England has. They haven't the capital. Their machines must be kept going hour after hour and day after day.

MR. PEFFER: Dennet, I think it may be conceded that the Japanese, like any other people, are going to fight unless they can feed themselves. It may be conceded, I think, that as the world has been organized by great powers in the past Japan has not had an opportunity.

I doubt whether you can prove now that Japan could not buy enough from the Asiatic continent and sell enough back to the Asiatic continent to feed herself, without war.

MR. DENNET: That is true—if she'd been decent with her neighbors. Instead of making friends of her best customers, the Chinese, she has ravished their country; and, of course, they won't forgive her for a thousand years.

MR. MACNAIR: Very good, Dennet. You argue behind and you argue before. On the first hand, you say Japan must conquer countries in order to find raw materials and a place to sell her goods; and then you admit she has already made a tremendous enemy of China by the method she has used.

How do you tie these two ends of your grandmother together? I would like to see why it is necessary, if a country wants to sell to another country, to slap the other country down.

MR. DENNET: We must have a different system after this war is over; and, if we don't have a different system, civilization is going to destroy itself.

Meanwhile, the problem that is presented is how to stop a war. The world is in conflagration. All right, you have to stop it. We must do something beyond that. We are faced with an immediate situation. The Japanese are down on the borders of Thailand. They have come down the coast of China, and they are on their way to Singapore. If they get to Singapore, they occupy a very strategic position, by which they can split up the British Empire, command all the approaches to China and to the Far East—and something must be done about it.

MR. MACNAIR: Very true. Possibly you are overlooking certain peculiar aspects of Japanese governmental and administrative organization. We must keep in mind that, when Americans talk about a given proposition, Americans are thinking in terms of their own background, their racial psychology, their national customs. When we talk about Japan, it must be remembered that the Japanese are thinking along Japanese lines, along their background.

Now, there are two aspects that must be borne in mind with respect to Japan—and that is that fundamentally Japan is not a democracy. Japan is ruled by a divinely descended Emperor, a so-called "Son of Heaven"; and there is an independent military in that country, which is very different from the situation in this country.[2]

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[2] *The military tradition has dominated Japanese political, economic, and even religious life since the twelfth century, except for brief periods, especially between 1918 and 1931, during which time politicians influenced by financiers interested in international peace controlled Japanese affairs. In Japanese politics the cabinet and privy council give advice to the Emperor on civil policy, while the military leaders advise him on military matters. Traditionally, the military has direct access to the Emperor, whereas the civil advisers do not. This dual type of government has given rise to a dual diplomacy in Japan in which the military may be engaged in activities inimical to the ends of the cabinet and privy council. (See Kenneth Colegrove, "Militarism in*

MR. PEFFER: You simplify too much. There have been countries which have had no divine emperors, which have had no feudal classes, which are democracies, and which have done exactly the sort of thing which Japan is now doing.

Suppose we say this: The Japanese have ambitions of power, like any other country. The Japanese have desire for wealth, like any other country. Granted. Those have brought about, or are about to bring about, conflict.

Specifically, what does that matter to the United States?

MR. MACNAIR: It matters a great deal to the United States. If you look at it from almost any conceivable angle—from the angle of history, from the angle of national pride, from the angle of economic stakes, from the angle of world-relations and general peace—you can hardly name an aspect of American life and American background which is not specifically involved in the situation in the Far East.

MR. PEFFER: For instance, MacNair.

MR. MACNAIR: For instance, the very year in which America declared and gained her independence from England she began trading in China. For more than a hundred and fifty years we have been building up an economic stake and a stake of friendship with the powers of the Far East.[3] We have aided Japan, after helping her to open her doors to the Western world. We have aided Japan for a long generation in entering upon the world-stage. [Turn to p. 10.]

Japan's Foreign Policy," in "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science," May, 1941.)

[3] *American investments in China in 1930 amounted to $240,000,000. Since the beginning of the "China incident" in 1937 the United States government has loaned China $230,000,000, for which arrangements have been made to obtain Chinese tungsten, tung oil, tin, and other commodities. To date it has been unofficially estimated that China has repaid about $18,500,000 of this indebtedness.*

CONSUMER INCOME: A COMPARISON*

The Japanese, with average real income only 25 per cent as large as an American's before the Chinese war, have had less and less money to spend→



WELFARE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF PERCENTAGES OF U.S.A. REAL ANNUAL INCOME PER PERSON

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* *Data for selected countries based on Colin Clark's estimates ("The Conditions of Economic Progress" [1940]) of per capita incomes, 1925–34.*

JAPAN'S WARTIME ECONOMY

Belts Are Tightened as Less and Less of the National Income Is Available for Consumer Expenditures*

EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS 10 PER CENT OF AVAILABLE NATIONAL INCOME

* *National income increased from 16,320,000,000 yen (¥) in 1936 to ¥20,476,000,000 in 1937, ¥22,518,000,000 in 1938, ¥24,519,000,000 in 1939, and ¥25,600,000,000 in 1940 (estimated). Gold dishoarding and capital consumption during these years increased available national income to ¥16,320,000,000 in 1936, ¥21,161,000,000 in 1937, ¥23,301,000,000 in 1938, ¥25,517,000,000 in 1939, and ¥26,807,000,000 in 1940. An approximation of the portion available for consumer expenditures is obtained by deducting government expenditures and investment plus private investments from the totals. (See T. Y. Hu, op. cit.)*

MR. DENNET: Oh, I don't think that trade with China has ever been a very important thing. We have a very different situation now from what we had forty or fifty years ago. The American people are riding on wheels. They are riding on rubber tires. They have to have gas. They are really dependent now on a set of products which come from an area which some years ago we'd hardly thought of as being within the Far East. Now the Japanese are getting down there and are getting astride of a trade route which is of very considerable importance to us.

MR. MACNAIR: You are quite right. And that must be looked at not only from the point of view that you have just indicated, of getting control of this extreme southern route from the Indian Ocean into the waters of the East and the South Pacific Ocean; it must be remembered that, during the past generation or so, Japan has come into control of every one of the approaches to eastern Asia, except the extreme northern one and the extreme southern one.

MR. PEFFER: And then what?

MR. MACNAIR: The extreme northern route has not yet played a part of any particular consequence. It may with Russia within a few years. However, with the United States in the Philippine Islands and with Great Britain in Singapore, Great Britain and the United States have, up to the present, one road of entrance to the Far East, and it is absolutely necessary that they keep that road open.

MR. DENNET: Now listen—it comes down to just this: Wherever Japan has gone she has established a monopoly.

MR. MACNAIR: Exactly.

MR. DENNET: There are no Americans in Korea any more. There are a few Americans in Manchuria. There were never any Americans in Formosa. Wherever she goes, she establishes a monopoly at a monopoly price, and Americans don't like it.

MR. MacNAIR: And just a few years ago, when I was in North China, I had an opportunity to hear a great many accounts as well as to see certain aspects of the methods which Japan is pursuing at the present moment in China.

You said, quite rightly, that there are few Americans in Korea and in Manchukuo or in Manchuria. In the last ten years American and European interests have been booted out; and they are now being booted out of North China. Shanghai is trembling because of the situation that may develop any minute if Japan takes over the International Settlement.

MR. DENNET: Well, the time is coming when, if the American people acquiesce in this now, they will go back and fight a war in the Far East. I don't believe that you can really have peace in the Far East if the Japanese get control of Singapore. And that is the question which seems to be concerning the British and the American foreign offices at the present moment.

MR. PEFFER: As a matter of fact, the United States and Japan have been pretty much at loggerheads since before there was any question of any change in the status of Singapore, and so forth. As a matter of fact, the United States has been at loggerheads with every country which has threatened to make a monopoly of the Chinese market.

Now I think we can agree on this: That Japan, wherever she goes, seeks to establish a monopoly; that the United States does not, on all evidence thus far, intend to permit any other country to establish a monopoly in China or elsewhere in the Far East.[4]

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[4] *The United States government expressed its attitude toward the Japanese announcement of plans for a "new order" in East Asia in a note to the Japanese government December 31, 1938: "This Government is well aware that the situation [in the Far East] has changed. This Government is also well aware that many of the changes have been brought about by the action of Japan. This Government does not admit, how-*

Now, are you convinced that that is of sufficiently vital interest to all of the one hundred and thirty million people of the United States to warrant the risk of war?

MR. DENNET: As a matter of fact, it isn't merely in the Far East that we object to monopolies. We object to monopolies anywhere.

Now, what is it you are looking forward to after this war is over, Peffer? Are you going to have a world which is divided into compartments, with Japan having a large section of the Far East—about half the population of the globe—and Hitler having Europe, and Uncle Sam having the Western Hemisphere? Why, that is an impossible kind of thing. We'll never be content with it, nor will Hitler be content with it, nor will the Japanese be content with it. We must get out of our minds the idea that a people must establish a political control over a particular area outside their own boundaries in order to live.

MR. PEFFER: Now look, Dennet, when you say "we," define it. True, this is the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE, and it is an estimable trio.

MR. DENNET: This is a cracker-barrel trio in a country store in any city or village in the United States. And we are all secretaries of state.

MR. PEFFER: Good.

MR. MACNAIR: I'd like to say I entirely agree with one point you made a moment ago, and I think it is one that should be brought to the attention of every American. It is this: If Hitler has his way and all of Europe and most of Africa falls to German

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ever, that there is need or warrant for any power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms or conditions of a 'new order' in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto."

control, and if the divinely descended Japanese have their way, and all of Asia and a good part of the islands of the Pacific fall under Japanese control, it means that the United States is being forced back on herself in the North and South Americas, and she is extremely likely to follow an imperialistic, Hitlerian, Japanese method with respect to the North and South American continents. Do you feel that that is a thing the United States wants to be forced into doing?

MR. DENNET: If we are going to have a world divided up into compartments, then there is no alternative but for the United States to start off and have the biggest empire of them all. That means that we must have the biggest navy and the biggest army and the biggest taxes; and no one knows where it is going to stop.

MR. PEFFER: All right, Dennet, let us get to the concrete. We have talked generally. Now precisely, concretely, what shall the United States do? Suppose Japan does go into Thailand tomorrow—what, concretely, shall the United States do, within twenty-four hours?

MR. DENNET: Attack them on the flank.

MR. PEFFER: How?

MR. DENNET: Attack their communications along the China coast—from Manila, to be quite specific—and let the British attack them on the other side, through Burma and the Malay States.

MR. PEFFER: In other words, you would go to war?

MR. DENNET: The shooting begins.

MR. PEFFER: MacNair?

MR. MACNAIR: I entirely agree with what Dennet has said. It is a matter of geography; it is a matter of economics; it is a matter of power. From every angle the United States is involved, and as a great power she cannot withdraw from a situation which, according to the latest reports, confronts her.

BOX-SCORE OF JAPANESE SELF
OF ESSENT



A. Suffiency with Exportable Surplus
B. Adequate To Meet Domestic Demand
C. Inadequate To Meet Domestic Demand
D. Complete or Almost Complete Dependence upon Foreign Sources

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Data compiled by Chinese Council for Economic Research from G. A. Rousch, *Strategic Mineral Supplies* (1939); J. W. Finch and J. W. Furness, *An Analysis of the Strategic Mineral Problem of the United States* (1938); and other sources. See T. Y. Hu, *Japan's Economy under War Strain* (1941), listed among "Suggested Readings," page 25.

CIENCY AND MAJOR SOURCES
'ORTS, 1939

From the United States

[IN PER CENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS FROM FOREIGN SOURCES]

From the British Empire



EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS 10 PER CENT OF IMPORTS BY VALUE

If you take your map of the Far East and look at Manila and at Hongkong and then at French Indo-China (which has been taken over in the past few months), then you will find that Japan is sticking her neck out rather far. In order to get from the Japanese Archipelago down to French Indo-China and Thailand, or Siam, and then the Malay Peninsula, Japan is sticking her neck out between two battle-axes.

MR. DENNET: We are bearing down pretty heavily on Japan, and certainly she has brought it upon herself; but I think we ought to make it perfectly clear that the American people, so far as we can observe, have no feeling of personal animosity toward the Japanese.[5]

MR. MacNAIR: That is very true.

MR. DENNET: We aren't looking forward to the destruction of Japan.

MR. MacNAIR: Not at all.

MR. DENNET: Japan must get back inside her borders, but, when she has done that, it is equally our obligation to see what can be done to remove the causes of her unrest.

MR. PEFFER: But in the meantime, I take it, we are for going to war with Japan if Japan goes into Siam?

MR. DENNET: We are going to establish peace in the Far East.

MR. PEFFER: By war?

MR. DENNET: By war! That is the only practical way to establish peace.

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[5] *The freezing of Japanese assets in the United States and in the British Commonwealth of Nations by governmental decrees resulted in retaliatory action of a similar nature by Japan, effectively stopping almost all trade between these countries. For an indication of Japanese dependence upon imports from the United States and the British Empire see the illustration on page 15.*

MR. MacNAIR: One point hasn't been mentioned that has confused some of us a good deal. Is Japan, in following her present policy, acting as the tool of Hitler, or is she acting supposedly in self-interest?

MR. DENNET: She is fishing in troubled waters.

MR. MacNAIR: You don't feel she is doing this as a member of the Axis?

MR. DENNET: She is pursuing a national interest and nothing else.

MR. PEFFER: Nothing else.

MR. DENNET: She has no feeling whatever for Hitler or Europe or anybody else.

MR. MacNAIR: I am inclined to agree with you, but as co-students of the Far East I wondered whether you would agree with me.

It seems to me that it is just about as clear as anything could be, with the developments since 1870 in Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria and Mongolia and northern China and central China, that Japan is doing this not as a member of the Axis but as a country which, as you said, is fishing in troubled waters.

MR. DENNET: I know; but, of course, you mustn't overlook the fact that this is a very awkward time for us to have a war with Japan.

MR. PEFFER: The Japanese are not sentimental. The Japanese never do anything except in national interest. I doubt whether any country ever does anything except in national interest.

MR. DENNET: Right!

MR. PEFFER: I think it is equally true that at this moment it would be extremely unfortunate in its effects on the Atlantic for

the United States to get into a war with Japan. Therefore, if I had had had the power, I would never have let this situation come up.

MR. MACNAIR: Oh, come off, Peffer. You "wouldn't have let this situation come up." Who are you? How would you stop a situation from coming up when it begins to come?

MR. PEFFER: I should like to answer that by saying that if I had had the power of decision for America, I should have let the

Japanese go on and concentrated all American help in the Atlantic Ocean.

MR. MacNAIR: Well, all right—what's to stop it? If that is your policy, why not say so?

MR. PEFFER: Now it is much too late.

MR. MacNAIR: It is never too late to do nothing.

MR. PEFFER: Oh, yes, it is—history cannot be unrolled. Now the situation is as it is, and regretfully I do think Japan must be stopped.

I am not quite in the galloping mood that you gentlemen are. I think I should prefer still, privately, to try to persuade the Japanese, by threats, by unmistakable assurance, that they go forward at their peril.

MR. MacNAIR: According to the latest reports, the British government and the American government have already given the gravest, most serious, and most definite assurances to Tokyo that if certain things take place certain other things of a disagreeable nature will also take place. Now, if that is true, then I still ask you, Peffer, what are you going to do about it? Are you going to move rapidly backward or are you going to move forward; or are you going to try to sit still—and, if you are going to sit still, how still?

MR. PEFFER: At this point we no longer can sit still.

MR. MacNAIR: Then are you going to move forward or backward?

MR. PEFFER: Now I shall have to move forward.

MR. MacNAIR: Well, what does that mean, then? Doesn't that mean war?

MR. PEFFER: It means, I am afraid, MacNair, that this is a miracle. When three gentlemen from the Far East agree on any-

thing, except the weather, that is a miracle. When three gentlemen from the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE agree on anything, that is a miracle.

I am not entirely comfortable about that, and I am wondering whether we haven't stacked the cards a little bit.

MR. MACNAIR: Who?

MR. PEFFER: We three—that's who.

MR. MACNAIR: For example?

MR. PEFFER: As you said before, Dennet and I should look at a map of the Philippines and see what it means. I am trying to visualize the man in Missouri who has two youngsters of twenty and twenty-two, who, having listened this far (I hope he has), looks at his map of the Philippines and then says, "There are the Philippines and there are my two youngsters. What about it?"

We three are in agreement. I am not arguing with you. I am raising the question, "Are we three wrong?" Have we demonstrated our case satisfactorily to that man in Missouri?

MR. DENNET: I made a trip across the continent last winter, and I was perfectly astonished to find that in groups where there was the greatest difference of opinion as to whether we should involve ourselves in the European war, there was a general agreement that we should do something about the Far East.

We have a sentimental interest out there, which I don't exactly understand. It has always been there, and I think we always shall have it; but it becomes a matter of immediate interest to the man in Missouri and the man in Arkansas and the man in New York City, because we are all riding on rubber tires. And we don't want to pay twice or three times as much for rubber tires as we have been paying. We have had some experiences already with the Japanese jacking up the prices of things when they got control of them, and we don't like that kind of thing.

MR. MacNAIR: The Americans have stood for a very long time for a policy of literal freedom of trade. I know, Peffer, what you are thinking.

MR. DENNET: Let's go on.

MR. PEFFER: Where, MacNair? Not in America and not in the Philippines.

MR. MacNAIR: What?

MR. PEFFER: Not in America and not in the Philippines.

MR. MacNAIR: We haven't blocked out all the foreigners from the Philippines. Look at your statistics. We haven't blocked out the Japanese from American trade.[6]

MR. DENNET: Look here! If you think we believe in free trade, why don't we let in the $4.50 bicycles from Japan? Japan makes a perfectly marvelous bicycle for $4.50. She sells it all through the Far East. And our five-and-ten-cent stores would just love to sell them here if they only had a chance to get them in.

MR. MacNAIR: Yes, and I should think a $4.50 bicycle, such as you describe, *ought* to be sold in a five-and-ten-cent store. It would be just the place and about the only place it could be sold.

MR. DENNET: Lots of people would buy it.

MR. PEFFER: Now, MacNair, let's not get virtuous about the channels of trade and America's morality about the channels of trade. It is conceded that, as the world is now organized, nations

[6] *Japan has ranked third as a source of American imports for many years. American imports from Japan, valued at $173,000,000 in 1936, declined only to $157,000,000 in 1940. In the years 1937–40 the United States received $693,000,000 in gold from Japan compared with $645,000,000 of merchandise. In this way the United States supplied Japan with foreign exchange needed for increasingly large imports necessitated by the war in China.*

are going to fight about markets. If they do, no one is more or less virtuous than the other. I have inserted the qualification, "as the world is now organized."

Now that might, of course, raise the question of whether it is essential that we do this in the Far East forever.

MR. DENNET: You cannot discuss what is going on over there on the borders of Thailand today without looking forward a little bit and raising the question of what kind of a world you want to live in, in the future, and what kind of a world you want your children to grow up in.

MR. PEFFER: Yes. I should say now you have come to what is, to me, the only really consistent and satisfying reason for stopping Japan. I agree that if you have a great new empire rampaging all over the Pacific there isn't going to be any peace; and the United States is not going to let any great empire rampage over the Pacific. That is my only reason for wanting to stop Japan.

MR. DENNET: Mind you, this is still a European problem, and you can't fight a war in the Far East and win in the Far East and lose in Europe. The destiny of the world is still going to be settled in Europe; but, while this situation is going on, hold everything you have.

MR. PEFFER: What did you mean by the kind of world we want? What did you mean by that, Dennet?

MR. DENNET: I mean the kind of world such as Mr. Hull has been talking about for the last thirty years, in which there is a normal exchange of products between nations to the benefit of everyone.

MR. MACNAIR: It seems to me, Dennet, that the Japanese and the Americans at the present moment are pretty much in the fix pictured the other day by the cartoonist down in Baltimore. One Japanese is sitting, and another one comes up to him, all hot and

bothered, and he says, "Ha-ha! Rest of world very mystified about what Japan is going to do." The other fellow says, "Not so ha-ha. We don't know ourselves." It seems to me that it is not only the Japanese who don't know but it is also we three on the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE. Ha-ha! What of it?

MR. DENNET: We haven't given as much thought as we should to what kind of a world we want to live in; and, if we are going to have a rational world, then the kind of thing which Japan is doing in the Far East as well as the kind of thing Hitler is doing in Europe simply must be stopped.

MR. MACNAIR: Do you feel that it is too late to use persuasive measures with Japan?

MR. DENNET: I am afraid it is. The only persuasive measures they would know would be loaded guns.

MR. PEFFER: The only persuasive measures would be an unmistakable recognition that if they go further they face the risk of a war with the United States.

MR. MACNAIR: Either we put up or we shut up.

MR. DENNET: That's right.

MR. MACNAIR: Japan puts up or shuts up. Both are putting up and neither will shut up. And so what?

MR. PEFFER: Then what do you want as a new kind of world in the Far East? What could you visualize?

MR. DENNET: Why, after this war is over, I am perfectly willing to take up the case for Japan and see that the trade obstacles which have given her so much trouble and which have threatened her national security are removed. I think it is very conceivable that in a few years we will be taking up the case for Japan and trying to give her the very opportunities which she now tries to get by military force.

MR. PEFFER: Then, what you are really saying is that while, on the one hand, we must stop Japan, on the other hand, in all logic, and having the desire for peace, this country, like all the occidental countries, must face an economic retreat in the Far East?

MR. DENNET: Well, I think we must have a wholly different kind of economic relationship between nations, and it may mean that some nations which have their standards of living up very high must stop.

MR. PEFFER: Apparently, gentlemen, we are agreed on this: Japan cannot be permitted to go further. The United States must take steps to compel it to recede. On that point, at least, we are agreed.

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NEWAY, ELIOT, "U.S. Oil and Japan," *Asia,* August, 1941. *What American policy toward Japan has been and what changes are now dictated by new circumstances are discussed by an expert in Asiatic economics.*

EFFER, NATHANIEL, "Squeeze Japan Now," *Nation,* August 2, 1941. *A plea for American economic and diplomatic action to stymie Japan before she has gained strength by military action.*

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———, "Showdown in the Pacific," *Saturday Evening Post*, May 31, 1941. *A writer who has spent years with the Chinese armies describes Japan's problems in the Pacific and America's ability to defend its possessions.*

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OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. What conditions in Japan resulting from industrialization are said to contribute to the urgency of her present circumstances? Page 3.
2. What two aims are listed as primary motives for Japanese expansion into China and other parts of East Asia? Page 4.
3. Japanese seizure of Singapore would have what effect upon British interests? Page 6.
4. What distinctive feature of Japan's government is cited as partly responsible for her present expansionist policy? Page 6.
5. American trade relations with China commenced in what year? Page 7.
6. What important American import from the Far East is mentioned as responsible for American concern with far eastern affairs? Page 10.
7. What feature of Japanese economic policy has forced American business out of Japanese-dominated areas? Pages 10–11.
8. What course for America is predicted if Japan dominates Asia and Germany dominates Europe after the war ends? Page 13.
9. What two methods of persuading Japan to withdraw her armies are suggested by the speakers? Pages 16 and 19.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on pages 25–26.

*

1. Japan has been engaged in expanding her empire periodically for nearly half a century and has been at war in China since 1937. To what factors do you attribute current American concern and diplomatic action? Do you think the United States is bluffing? Do you expect the situation to become less tense without appreciable change in the balance of power in the Pacific? Discuss.

2. From what you know or have read about Japanese political controls, outline the differences between the Japanese form of government and the governments of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy.

3. The speakers refer to Japan's inability to obtain raw materials for her industries. Relate this fact to American policy toward Japan in recent years. Can you suggest arrangements which would benefit Japan and deter her from ambitions of empire?

4. If you are familiar with the history of Japanese expansion, discuss the success of the various conquests in (*a*) reducing population pressure; (*b*) increasing export markets; (*c*) increasing available sources of raw materials.

5. Discuss the importance of Singapore to the United States and to Great Britain.

6. Would you approve of a war fought to protect American supply lines to the Netherlands East Indies? Can you describe any parallel circumstances where America might be likely to use force to protect her interests? Discuss.

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160. *Balkan Blitzkrieg*
161. *War Aims and Peace Aims*
162. *Which Road for America?*
163. *Lessons from Europe's War*
164. *The Effect of the Blitzkrieg on the Economic Order*
165. *Defense and America's Health*
166. *Roosevelt* vs. *Hitler*
167. *Polls and the Crisis*
168. *Where's Bunker Hill?*
169. *War against the Middle Classes?*
170. *The Crisis and Your Pocketbook*
171. *America and the German-Soviet War*
172. *Soviet Russia at War*
173. *Our Liberties: Are They in Danger?*
174. *Blueprint for Hemisphere Defense*
175. *Should America Clear the Seas of the Nazis?*
176. *Economic Consequences of a German Victory*
177. *Defense: Who'll Pay the Piper?* August 3

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